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Much has been, and will be, written about what the Basic Law – Jewish Nation-State
(or the Nation’s Law) does, but attention is also due to how it does what it does. The
use of language in the Nation’s Law is so troubling in its Sophist-like concealment
of the meanings of the norms it encodes, that it creates, perhaps, injustice of the
second order. Stated differently, the language usage conventions in the Nation’s
Law are normative actions in and of themselves, and examining these new norms is
necessary for a full comprehension of this Law.
The Unreliability of Language
It seems apt to open a discussion on the Nation’s Law use of language with Hayim
Nahman Bialik, Israel’s national Poet. In his seminal 1913 essay, Revealment
and Concealment in Language, Bialik laments not only the inherent instability of
language, but our constant and futile hope to rely on language’s alleged ability to
represent something stable, and to communicate with others. Bialik insists that
language cannot provide a stable support against the existential abyss inherent to
the human condition, and reminds us that using it is only digging a deeper hole of
vagueness and misrepresentations. Still, he uses language, because there is no
other way, and he is puzzled by this dependence on something that is knowingly
unreliable.
“What is there to Wonder at? – This: the feeling of security and the satisfaction
that accrue to human beings when they speak, although they are really leading
their thoughts and feelings beside the still waters and across the iron bridge of the
Messiah, without their having any conception of how shaky is their bridge of mere
words, how deep and dark their void is that opens at their feet, and how much every
step taken safely partakes of the miracle. For it is clear that language with all its
associations does not introduce us at all into the inner area, the essence of things,
but that, on the contrary, language itself stands as a barrier before them.”
Despite this tragic failure of language, Bialik takes as an axiom that language users
would seek the right language to represent their message accurately. Their choice of
words and sentences will be careful and candid even when the message they want
to communicate is false. Even if accurate words that represent the core of one’s truth
or message can never be found – the search after them he takes for granted, as a
basic aspect of the human experience.
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With any piece of legislation, it is hard to talk about the drafters’ intention, for familiar
reasons: they are not one drafter, there is constant political negotiation that often
undermines the coherence of the final text, and even if there was one drafter who
thought she had a clear intention in the choice of one phrasing over another, the
post-structuralists would remind us that we should be suspicious of the notion that
intention exists before its expression in language. Still, more than with other pieces
of legislation, it is particularly hard to talk about the Nation’s Law’s drafters. The
finalized text of this Basic Law is a mishmash product of many layers and competing
versions that were put together and finalized hastily, as part of political pushes and
pulls, producing a document that lacks the sense of cohesive style and harmonious
comprehensiveness that are usually found in constitutional documents.
Notwithstanding the many drafters and multiple voices traceable in the text, the
Nation’s Law is consistent in its dishonest usage of language. Almost in every
clause, the Law’s language gives the impression that all we are reading are uplifting
statements of merely symbolic and declaratory significance, expressing the deep
and undisputable connections between the Jewish people to Israel’s land. Almost
every clause necessitates a savvy reader of legislation, familiar with the normative
climate of Israel’s constitutional law, to fully comprehend and uncover the actual
meaning of the phrasings. Terms that sound profound and uplifting, aimed at unifying
a nation around a document that finally puts into words its ethos as the nation-
state of the Jewish people, turn out, after a closer reading, to be divisive rather than
unifying; hurtful rather than protective; entrenched rather than open; bitter rather than
celebratory; fearful rather than reassured; oppressor’s words in a victim’s gown.
Dishonest and Omissive Use of Language
Clause after clause, seemingly profound assertions, that move back and forth
between a celebratory and a solemn tone, inscribe Israel as the historical homeland
of the Jewish people, and lay out the practical implications of this connection. Clause
after clause, what is written and stated conceals what is not written and unstated.
Not written are the formal and symbolic powers and authority that this Law grants for
limiting, silencing, and denying practices, individuals, communities, or speech that
might not fall within the definitions of what Israel stands on and stands for, as the
Nation’s Law defines.
The profound and elevating assertion about the connection of Jews to Israel is made
in article 1(b), anchoring this connection by a long taxonomy of origin of the right
to self-determination. The right to self-definition of Jews in Israel is defined as a
“natural, cultural, religious and historical” right. So long and inelegant is the list, that
it may reveal an insecurity that each characteristic of this right would fail to stand on
its own, hence the need to tighten the grip by encompassing all possible justifying
frameworks, from man-made laws to metaphysical ones. What remains concealed,
however, is the implications of anchoring the Jewish people’s right to their homeland
in terms such as religion and culture, new terms in the terrain of Israeli legislation.
For example, if the right to self-determination is religious, this may well mean that
it would be legitimate from now on to deny rights from those not subscribing to
orthodox Judaism, whose monopoly has been governing marriage and divorce of
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Jews in Israel, religious services, prayer practices in the Western Wall, conversion,
and public schools’ curriculum.
The “culture” anchor of the right to self-determination seems at first sight more
soft and open-ended, perhaps allowing for alternative ways of imagining Jewish
life in Israel. But both religion and culture were hasty additions to the legislative
proposal just before the Knesset voted on the Law. Culture was thrown in, most
likely, to compensate for the last minute omission of a separate clause giving every
resident of Israel the right “to preserve their culture, education, heritage, language,
and identity.” This clause was presented as protecting Arab citizens’ culture rights,
but its broad phrasing makes it a likely basis for the majority’s rights as well. The
culture clause was omitted due to vast criticism that in the name of everyone’s right
to preserve their “culture, education, heritage, language, and identity,” it would grant
almost unlimited permissions to discriminate women, Arabs, LGBTs, and other
“othered” groups and limit their enjoyment of basic rights. For example, such a
clause could authorize the Western Wall authorities to prevent transgender people
from entering the site as their presence may contradict heritage or culture of the
dominant orthodox community praying at the Wall, or, for that matter, it could permit
any business owner from serving Arabs or same-sex couples. Similarly, such a
clause might provide a normative anchor to institutionalized sex-based segregation
and modest dress in public spaces, a rampant phenomenon in Israel today. Another
illustration of the risk of such a clause is that it would entrench communities’ rights
to absolute autonomy in their school curriculum, even when the curriculum denies
children of core language and science skills, or is imbued with divisive and alienating
accounts about minorities. As Prof. Gila Stopler noted in a brief about the harm of
the culture clause, unlike the structure of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty,
the Nation’s Law does not contain a limitation clause that restricts the rights it
enumerates through checks such as proportionality or due purpose, hence the
protection on the rights in the Nation’s Law are potentially limitless, unless courts find
ways to limit them through creative interpretations of the new normative climate that
this Law creates.
The Nation’s Law’s propositions about the status of Arabic in Israel provides another
example to its dishonest and convoluted speech. Article 4 declares that Hebrew
is the State’s language. But then, immediately, Arabic is stipulated as a language
that “has special status.” To readers not well-versed in the history of the status of
Arabic in Israeli law, granting “special status” to Arabic may seem like a progressive
recognition of the language and culture of 20% of Israel’s citizens and many more
under its rule since 1967. In fact, the Nation’s Law demotes the status of Arabic
rather than promotes it. Until this Law, Arabic was the second formal language of
Israel, alongside Hebrew. But hey – its “special” now.
In a radio debate just days before the Law passed, Jewish Home MK Bezalel
Smotritch argued against the worries I expressed that the law might be used to
further marginalize and exclude those outside the hegemony, that the left keeps
crying wolf, and there was no reason for worry.
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Language Becoming Practice
It took less than two months for my sober prediction to manifest vividly. The first
court case that interprets and applies the Nation’s law illustrates that the Law’s
dishonest celebratory language about the rights of the Jewish people serves
to license parochialism and chauvinism. The judicial usage of the Nation’s Law
provides an alarming illustration of tits dangers, so cynical and creative that I admit
that had such legal scenario been presented to me hypothetically, even I would have
thought it far-fetched.
In a tort case determining the damages due from Hamas to the plaintiff, who was
wounded and emotionally traumatized in a 1998 Tel Aviv suicide bombing, Vice
President Judge Moshe Drori of the Jerusalem’s District Court uses the Law to
increase the 4.4. million shekels in damages by one more million shekels, under the
category of damage without need of proof. Judge Drori anchored his decision in yet
another of the Law’s seemingly harmless clause, a clause that seems to be merely
restating the obvious commitment of Israel to its sons and daughters.
Article 6(a) posits: “The state shall foster the well-being of the Jewish people in
trouble or in captivity due to the fact of their Jewishness or their citizenship.”
As a basic law, explained Judge Drori, the Nation’s Law’s constitutional status
merits interpreting it to fit the larger normative context in which it operates. He then
proceeds to examine whether article 6(a) should apply to this case. That is, whether
the Jewish people or Israel’s citizens are in trouble because of the Defendant,
Hamas. Examining the Hamas Treaty, Judge Drori finds that it specifically declares
Jihad on the Jews, hence it is rightful to see Jews, let alone Jews in Israel, as
“Jewish people in trouble … due to the fact of their Jewishness or their citizenship”
as article 6(a) describes. The State has indeed failed in protecting the physical
and mental integrity of the plaintiff, but Article 6(a) enables offering an alternative
remedy, i.e. maximum compensations for Jews harmed by their predators as
Jews. The retroactivity of such interpretation of the new basic law on a terror attack
occurring two decades ego, does not trouble Judge Drori, because under Israeli law,
basic laws should also guide the interpretation of earlier legislation.
Similar interpretations of the law, that would not only protect Jews but oppress non-
Jews as well as Jews outside the hegemony, are immanent. Article 7, declaring the
State’s commitment to developing Jewish settlement (not necessarily in the occupied
territories) can be served to exclude non-Jews from equal access to accommodation,
let alone to land zoning and development of Arab municipalities. Article 3, glorifying
“a greater, united Jerusalem” as the capital of Israel, can serve to appropriate land
in East Jerusalem as well as outside its current municipal borders, and even to
authorize harsh steps against those whose speech supports dividing Jerusalem in
a future peace pact. This formulation of the status of Jerusalem is indeed not new,
and has already been inscribed, word for word, in 1980’s Basic Law: Jerusalem
Capital of Israel. By now, however, there are new normative foundations for silencing
competing visions about the future of Jerusalem, as evident in other recent Knesset
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laws, such as the laws dubbed the Anti-BDS Bill, the Nakba Law, and, most recently,
the Loyalty in Culture Law.
The Nation’s Law is not alone in its dishonest usage of language. Other recent
or presently pending legislative proposals from coalition MKs use and abuse
terms such as discrimination and accommodation in order to legalize exclusion
and discrimination. One recent amendment to the bill forbidding discrimination in
the goods and services sectors added a ban to discriminate clients and patrons
based on their place of residence. On its face this is a worthwhile patch to add
protection against unwarranted discrimination. But a closer review reveals that this is
another miniscule legislative step towards full normative appropriation and legislative
cohesion of the occupied territories: the ban against discrimination based on address
was tailored to prevent business owners, say an electricity technician, from refusing
to provide service in the settlements beyond the Green Line.
As a final example, a recent proposal to amend the Council of Higher Education Law
wishes to authorize academic institutions to operate sex-segregated programs for
any group who, “due to cultural reasons,” “has limited access to higher education.”
In order to further camouflage the exclusionary and discriminatory effects of such
proposal, it is entitled “Encouraging Access to Higher Education.”
Emptying Words of Meaning
In George Orwell’s Newspeak, “the word free still existed … but it could only be used
in such statements as ‘This dog is free from lice’… It could not be used in its old
sense of ‘politically free’ or ‘intellectually free’ since political and intellectual freedom
no longer existed even as concepts, and were therefore of necessity nameless.”
Unlike Orwell’s 1984, in its incremental yet rapid and steady erosion of the State’s
democratic foundations, current Israeli legislation does use words and concepts
that for Orwell’s totalitarian regime may have seemed dangerous because of their
potential to spark the imagination about a more just society, and then perhaps
awaken rebellion. Freedom, accommodation, amelioration of discrimination,
community, care, values, development, unity, openness, commitment, protection, or
community, are words that are still used in current Israeli legislation, because they
are misused and abused. The State is open, but only to immigration of Jews. It is
committed to “preserve the affinity” between the State and the Jewish people in the
Diaspora, but only to the extent that their Jewishness corresponds to the monolithic
definition of Judaism, and serves ad-hoc interests of the country.
The prevalent ethics and tactics of language usage in the Israeli legislation today,
in particular legislation defining the symbolic and physical borders of the nation,
transcend the imagination of both Bialik and Orwell. Its opaque and dishonest use
of language, its abuse of profound concepts and the refraining from stating the full
distributive implications of rules that are presented as having only a bright side,
renders such legislation incomprehensible to lay readers, and nearly maddening to
those with legal training.
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Most importantly, this new discursive practice seems to corrode the conditions
for speaking meaningfully according to both Bialik and Orwell. Both of them,
despite their complex and dark insights about language, imagined that despite the
inherent openness in words’ meaning, respect and aspiration to accurate speech
is preserved, and commitment to their spirit is preserved. This is not so in the way
language is exploited in the Nation’s Law.
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